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Free will is a cornerstone of our society, and psychological research
demonstrates that questioning its existence impacts social behavior.
In six studies, we testedwhether believing in freewill is related to the
correspondence bias, which reflects people’s automatic tendency to
overestimate the influence of internal as compared to external factors
when interpreting others’ behavior. All studies demonstrate a posi-
tive relationship between the strength of the belief in free will and
the correspondence bias. Moreover, in two experimental studies, we
showed that weakening participants’ belief in free will leads to a
reduction of the correspondence bias. Finally, the last study demon-
strates that believing in free will predicts prescribed punishment and
reward behavior, and that this relation is mediated by the correspon-
dence bias. Overall, these studies show that believing in free will
impacts fundamental social-cognitive processes that are involved in
the understanding of others’ behavior.
free-will belief | interpersonal perception | correspondence bias
Most people believe they have free will and judge themselvesand others through this lens (1, 2). However, the question of
whether free will exists or not is a long-standing philosophical
controversy (3, 4). Within the last decades, the scientific plausibility
of free will has been assaulted from several directions, including
neuroscience, genetics, and psychology (e.g., refs. 5–7). As such
anti–free-will viewpoints became in vogue not only within academia
(8) but also in the popular press (e.g., refs. 9–11), psychological
research has recently started investigating the psychological and
social consequences of casting doubts on free will (e.g., refs. 12–15).
Such research has shown that belief in free will is a predictor of
several behavioral and psychological variables. For example, cor-
relational studies have shown that people with a strong belief in
free will perform better in a variety of contexts, such as in work (16)
and academic settings (17). Likewise, studies involving experi-
mental manipulations of the belief in free will have demonstrated
that weakening people’s belief in free will increases antisocial be-
havior, such as cheating (18), racial prejudice (19), and aggres-
siveness toward others (1), as well as decreases prosocial attitudes
expressed in altruistic (1) and cooperative behavior (20).
Taken together, these studies indicate that believing in free
will impacts individuals’ social behavior and that shaking this
belief encourages cursory, impulsive, and selfish tendencies.
Neuroscience and cognitive research suggests that these behav-
ioral changes stemming from a weakened belief in free will may
be linked to a degradation of neural and cognitive mechanisms
underlying voluntary self-regulation, such as intentional action
preparation (21), deliberate motor inhibition (22, 23), and the
processing of performance errors (24, 25).
Although the research outlined above emphasized the effects
of believing in free will on people’s behavior, an intriguing and
broader question is whether free-will beliefs affect fundamental
social-cognitive processes that are involved in the perception and
understanding of others’ behavior as well. In this respect, pre-
vious studies indicate that the strength of the belief in free will
predicts intolerance for unethical behavior in others as well as
support for harsh criminal punishment (26–28). The general goal
of the present research is to examine whether the belief in free
will affects basic social-cognitive processes underlying perception
and judgment of other people’s behavior.
Perceiving and interpreting the behavior of others is one of the
most critical tasks people face in everyday social life (e.g., refs. 29
and 30). Past research has shown that, when judging others’
behavior, individuals have the tendency to underestimate the
impact of external forces (e.g., the situation) and overestimate
the role of factors that are internal to the person (e.g., his or her
personality)—a phenomenon referred to as the correspondence
bias (31) or the fundamental attribution error (32). Given that
some researchers question whether the terms “fundamental” and
“error” are actually appropriate (e.g., ref. 33), we refer to the
tendency to focus more strongly on internal factors as compared
to external factors with the term “correspondence bias.”
The specific goal of the current study is to examine whether
(and how) beliefs about free will affect the correspondence bias.
Interestingly, previous literature offers two potential alternative
hypotheses to this question. The “resource hypothesis” is based on
the observation that the correspondence bias is caused by auto-
matic processes. That is, individuals only correct for this bias when
they have ample time, cognitive resources, and the motivation to
do so (e.g., ref. 31). Given that the belief in free will has been
linked to increased self-regulation (22–25, 34), strong free-will
beliefs should attenuate the correspondence bias. Conversely, the
“intention attribution hypothesis” derives from the empirical ob-
servation that the belief in free will is associated to an increased
sense of agency (23, 35). That is, the more people believe in free
will, the more they perceive their own behavior as generated by
themselves (e.g., desires, goals), rather than by external forces (e.g.,
contexts, situations). Given the ample evidence that people use
their own perspective to understand and predict other people’s
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behavior (for an overview, see refs. 36 and 37), one could hy-
pothesize that individuals will also perceive others’ behavior as
being more strongly generated by internal, as compared to ex-
ternal forces. As a consequence, high levels of free-will beliefs
may enhance the correspondence bias.
To test the resource hypothesis against the intention attribution
hypothesis, we conducted six studies that specifically investigated the
link between the belief in free will and the correspondence bias.
Stimulus material (Supporting Information) and data (Datasets S1–
S4) of all our studies are made openly available. All studies were
covered by the rules of the Institutional Review Board from the
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Science of Ghent University
and were run via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. All participants pro-
vided informed consent at the beginning of the experiment and were
informed that participation was voluntary and that all answers were
processed and stored anonymously.
Study 1
Participants and Procedure. A total of 210 participants (43.3%
female) with ages ranging from 18 to 78 [mean (M) = 36.41,
SD = 11.46] participated in the study.
To measure the correspondence bias, we let participants read an
essay that was either in favor or against a controversial social issue,
and then asked them to rate the author’s attitude. The essays had
been previously used in the literature (e.g., refs. 38 and 39) and
consisted of arguments either in favor or opposed to prayer in
school (Supporting Information). While one-half of the participants
received an essay in which the author argued in favor of prayer in
school, the other half of participants received an essay that argued
against it. Crucially, participants were told that the essay was written
by a student under a no-choice condition, that is, the student was
instructed to either write in favor or against prayer in school.
After reading the essay, participants indicated their perception of
the author’s attitude toward prayer in school by responding to the
question “What do you think is the author’s attitude toward prayer
in school? Is it in favor or against prayer in school?” on a seven-
point scale ranging from 1 (strictly against) to 7 (strictly in favor).
Afterward, participants filled in the Free Will Inventory (FWI)
(40) (Supporting Information). The FWI includes 15 items mea-
suring the strength of the belief in free will and related constructs
such as dualism/nonreductionism and determinism on seven-
point rating scales. To obtain a global measure of how partici-
pants viewed their behavior as caused by their own free choice
and independent from prior events and their biological makeup
(4), we computed a compound score of the belief in free will by
averaging the free-will items with the dualism/nonreductionism
items and the reversed determinism items (for a similar ap-
proach, see refs. 22 and 25). The internal consistency of this
compound free-will score was acceptable (Cronbach’s α = 0.70).
Results. Confirming the presence of the correspondence bias,
participants who read the essay arguing in favor of prayer in
school perceived the essay author’s attitude more strongly in
favor of prayer in school (M = 5.97; SD = 1.57) than participants
who read the essay arguing against prayer in school (M = 1.88;
SD = 1.39) (t = 19.97, P < 0.001, d = 2.76).
To test to which degree the correspondence bias is related to
people’s endorsement of free will, we quantified—in line with pre-
vious research (e.g., ref. 41)—the correspondence bias as the extent
to which participants’ perceptions of the essay author’s attitude dif-
fered from the midpoint of the scale (i.e., from value 4). The cor-
relation analysis revealed that the correspondence bias positively
correlated with the belief in free will (r = 0.18, P = 0.011). This
observation indicates that the more people believe in free will, the
stronger their tendency to ascribe the cause of others’ behavior to
factors that are internal to the person. This positive correlation
supports the intention attribution hypothesis rather than the resource
hypothesis, which would have predicted a negative correlation.
Study 2a
Studies 2a and 2b aimed at replicating and extending the findings
of study 1 by using a different paradigm that focuses on the
different weight people assign to internal vs. external factors
when judging others’ behavior.
Participants and Procedure. A total of 210 participants (45.4%
female) with ages ranging from 18 to 78 (M = 37.77, SD = 11.99)
participated in the study.
To measure participants’ correspondence bias, we applied the
procedure used by Kitayama et al. (42). Participants read four
stories, with each story featuring a protagonist engaging in a
certain behavior. After reading each of the four stories, partici-
pants indicated their agreement/disagreement with four state-
ments on seven-point rating scales (1 = strongly disagree; 7 =
strongly agree). Two statements measured the attribution to
external factors, whereas the other two statements measured the
attribution to internal factors (see Supporting Information for
more details). Participants then filled in the FWI (40) to assess
participants’ belief in free will. As in study 1, an overall free-will
score was computed (Cronbach’s α = 0.82).
Results. In line with past research on the correspondence bias
(42), participants ascribed the protagonists’ behavior more
strongly to internal factors (M = 5.64; SD = 1.03) than to ex-
ternal factors (M = 4.49; SD = 1.15) (t = 11.85, P < 0.001, dz =
1.05). To test how the correspondence bias is related to people’s
endorsement of free will, a correspondence bias score was
computed by subtracting participants’ external attributions from
their internal attributions. High scores indicate a strong corre-
spondence bias—that is, a strong causal attribution to internal, as
compared to external factors. In accordance with the intention
attribution hypothesis and the results of study 1, the correspon-
dence bias positively correlated with the belief in free will (r =
0.39, P < 0.001), indicating that the more individuals believe in
free will, the more strongly they interpret others’ behavior as
originated by internal, as compared to external factors.
Study 2b
In study 2b, we conducted a high-powered preregistered repli-
cation of study 2a (study plan available at https://aspredicted.org/
uw938.pdf) by doubling the sample size of study 2a. Thus, we
aimed at collecting 420 participants. Eventually, 469 participants
(53.5% female) with ages ranging from 18 to 84 (M = 37.39,
SD = 12.45) participated in our study (when we analyze the data
with the first 420 participants only, the results remain the same).
Cronbach’s α for the overall free-will score was α = 0.76.
Similar to the results of study 2a, participants ascribed be-
havior more strongly to internal factors (M = 5.73; SD = 0.93)
than to external factors (M = 4.58; SD = 1.12) (t = 17.32, P <
0.001, dz = 0.80). Moreover, in accordance with study 2a, the
preregistered analysis yielded a significant positive correlation
between belief in free will and the correspondence bias (r = 0.35,
P < 0.001).
Study 3a
Taken together, studies 1, 2a, and 2b strongly support the hy-
pothesis that believing in free will is positively associated with the
correspondence bias. However, these findings are based on
correlational data only. Therefore, in studies 3a and 3b, we
adopted an experimental approach to manipulate participants’
belief in free will before measuring the correspondence bias.
Participants and Design. A total of 164 participants (50.6% fe-
male) participated in our study [a few participants did not fill in
the FWI (43); therefore, all analysis that involved the FWI could
be run on n = 137 only]. The ages ranged from 18 to 68 (M =
36.42, SD = 11.82). The design was a 2 (belief manipulation:
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anti-free will vs. control) × 2 (attribution: internal vs. external)
mixed design with belief manipulation as between-subject factor
and attribution as within-subject factor.
Procedure. To manipulate belief in free will, we applied a ma-
nipulation that has been successfully and often used in previous
research (for a metaanalysis, see Supporting Information) in-
vestigating the consequences of weakening people’s belief in free
will (e.g., 18, 21, 24, 25, 27, 43). Specifically, participants read a
passage of the book The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific
Search for the Soul written by Francis Crick (44). While partici-
pants in the anti–free-will group read a text claiming that sci-
entists now recognize that free will is an illusion, participants in
the control group read a passage from the same book that did
not mention free will (see Supporting Information for more de-
tails). After participants read the scientific text, the same sce-
narios used in studies 2a and 2b were administered. Afterward,
participants completed the FWI (ref. 43; Cronbach’s α = 0.82).
Results.
Manipulation check.A t test for independent samples indicates that
participants in the anti–free-will condition reported a weaker
belief in free will (M = 4.53, SD = 0.98) than participants in the
control condition (M = 4.92, SD = 0.82) (t = 2.54, P = 0.012, d =
0.43), indicating that the manipulation effectively weakened
participants’ belief in free will.
Belief in free will and correspondence bias. To test the effect of the
belief manipulation on the correspondence bias we ran a 2 (belief
manipulation: anti-free will vs. control) × 2 (attribution: internal vs.
external) mixed ANOVA. The analysis revealed a main effect of
attribution [F(1,162) = 127.56, P < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.44], indicating that
participants attributed the cause of the protagonists’ behavior in the
scenarios more to internal (M = 5.82, SD = 0.88) than to external
factors (M = 4.71, SD = 1.05). The main effect of the belief ma-
nipulation was not significant [F(1,162) = 0.69, P = 0.41]. More im-
portant for our hypothesis, however, was the significant interaction
between belief manipulation and attribution [F(1,162) = 6.72, P =
0.01, ηp
2 = 0.04], indicating that participants in the anti–free-will
group showed a smaller correspondence bias (M = 0.87, SD = 1.15)
than participants in the control group (M = 1.39, SD = 1.40) (t =
2.59, P = 0.01, d = 0.41) (Fig. 1). Further post hoc analyses in-
dicated that participants in the anti–free-will group (M = 4.87, SD =
0.99) put more emphasis on external factors than control partici-
pants (M = 4.52, SD = 1.09) (t = 2.17, P = 0.032, d = 0.34). There
was no statistically meaningful difference between anti–free-will
participants (M = 5.74, SD = 0.89) and control participants (M =
5.91, SD = 0.87) in terms of internal factors (t = 1.19, P = 0.24).
Finally, we tested whether the correspondence bias correlated
with the belief in free will. In line with our previous studies, the
belief in free will showed a positive correlation with the corre-
spondence bias (r = 0.18, P = 0.037).
Study 3b
Method. To replicate the previous experimental finding, in study 3b
we conducted an exact and high-powered preregistered replication
of study 3a (study plan available at https://aspredicted.org/w82be.pdf;
see Supporting Information for further details) with 504 participants
(60.9% female). The ages ranged from 18 to 79 (M = 40.41, SD =
13.15). Cronbach’s α for the overall free-will score was α = 0.77.
Results.
Manipulation check. Like in study 3a, a t test for independent sam-
ples indicates that anti–free-will participants reported weaker
belief in free will (M = 4.55, SD = 0.82) than control participants
(M = 4.72, SD = 0.73) (t = 2.50, P = 0.013, d = 0.22).
Belief in free will and correspondence bias. The 2 (belief manipula-
tion: anti-free will vs. control) × 2 (attribution: internal vs. ex-
ternal) mixed ANOVA yielded a main effect for attribution
[F(1,502) = 487.48, P < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.49], indicating that partic-
ipants attributed the protagonists’ behavior more to internal
(M = 5.92, SD = 0.74) than to external factors (M = 4.80, SD =
1.03). The main effect of the belief manipulation was not sig-
nificant [F(1,502) = 0.11, P = 0.75]. Crucially, however, the in-
teraction between belief manipulation and attribution was
significant [F(1,502) = 4.41, P = 0.036, ηp
2 = 0.01]. This indicates
that anti–free-will participants showed a smaller correspondence
bias (M = 1.02, SD = 1.10) than control participants (M = 1.24,
SD = 1.20) (t = 2.10, P = 0.036, d = 0.19) (Fig. 1). Further post
hoc analyses indicate a statistical trend that control participants
(M = 5.99, SD = 0.69) put stronger emphasis on internal factors
than anti–free-will participants (M = 5.86, SD = 0.79) (t = 1.93,
P = 0.055, d = 0.18). There was no significant difference between
anti–free-will participants (M = 4.84, SD = 1.02) and control
participants (M = 4.75, SD = 1.03) in terms of external factors
(t = 0.96, P = 0.34).
Finally, consistent with our previous studies, belief in free will
showed a positive correlation with the correspondence bias (r =
0.26, P < 0.001).
Study 4
Studies 3a and 3b replicate the findings obtained in studies 1, 2a,
and 2b. That is, the belief in free will correlates positively with the
correspondence bias. In addition, both studies show that reducing
participants’ belief in free will decreases the correspondence bias.
However, one may argue that reducing free-will beliefs by letting
participants’ read a scientific text that denies free will affects more
than just participants’ belief in free will. As a consequence, the
correspondence bias might be affected by other factors rather than
the belief in free will. Therefore, it is important to note that our
claim that believing in free will is associated with the correspon-
dence bias is not limited to experimental studies, but is especially
based on the correlation between measured free-will beliefs and
the correspondence bias. This correlation is significant in all of our
studies. Nevertheless, it might be that other factors related to the
belief in free will account for the correlation between believing in
free will and the correspondence bias.
In particular, one might argue that believing in free will is re-
lated to locus of control, which in turn may account for the
correspondence bias. According to Rotter (45), an individual
perceives the outcome of an event as being either within or beyond
his or her personal control and understanding. A person with an
internal locus of control believes that he or she has influence over
outcomes through ability, effort, or skills. On the other hand, a
person with an external locus of control believes that forces out-
side the control of the individual determine outcomes. Therefore,
one could hypothesize that individuals with a strong belief in free
will have also a strong internal locus of control, and that it is the
internal locus of control that accounts for the influence of free-will
beliefs on the correspondence bias. In addition, given that indi-
viduals who believe in free will are expected to feel more in
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Fig. 1. Correspondence bias as a function of belief manipulation in studies
3a and 3b. Error bars represent SEs.
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control of their behavior (23, 35), they may also perceive more
certainty when they are called to judge others’ actions. Differences
in the certainty of their judgments, rather than differences in the
belief in free will itself, may thus account for the link between the
belief in free will and the correspondence bias. Therefore, in study
4, we tested whether participants’ locus of control as well as their
certainty in their judgments can account for the link between
believing in free will and the correspondence bias.
In addition, we investigated whether the correspondence bias
accounts for the observation that believing in free will affects
retributive punishment (27). As the correspondence bias con-
tributes to how people interact with each other (46–48), one
could reason that the correspondence bias mediates the re-
lationship between an individual’s belief in free will and his or
her attitude toward others’ behavior. One could therefore expect
that believing in free will influences not only retributive pun-
ishment toward others but also rewarding behavior. Thus, in
study 4, we examined whether the strength of the belief in
free will predicts levels of prescribed punishment and reward
for unethical and ethical behavior, respectively, and crucially
whether this relationship is based on the level of participants’
correspondence bias.
Participants and Procedure. A total of 212 subjects (48.60% fe-
male) participated in our study. The ages ranged from 18 to 71
(M = 38.68, SD = 11.83).
In line with studies 2 and 3, we assessed the correspondence
bias with the scenarios introduced by Kitayama et al. (42). To
assess prescribed punishing and rewarding behavior, participants
indicated after each scenario on two seven-point scales to which
degree they would reward or punish the other person’s behavior
(see Supporting Information for more details). For positive be-
haviors, we calculated the mean score of the reward item with
the reversed item of the punishment item to compute an overall
score of prescribed reward. Similarly, for negative behavior, we
calculated the mean score of the punishment item with the re-
versed reward item to compute an overall score of prescribed
punishment. Finally, to compute an overall score of prescribed
behavior, we computed the mean of the total reward score and
the total punishment score.
To assess participants’ certainty in their judgments, they in-
dicated after each scenario on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly
disagree; 7 = strongly agree) whether they agreed with the fol-
lowing statement: “Regarding the statements above, I am sure
that my judgments are correct.”
After participants completed all scenarios, they filled in the
FWI (ref. 43; Cronbach’s α = 0.75). Finally, we assessed Rotter’s
(45) locus of control scale (Supporting Information). To compute
a total score, we computed the sum score of the items (Cron-
bach’s α = 0.83). High values indicate a relatively strong internal,
as compared to an external, locus of control.
Results.
Correspondence bias. As in our previous studies, we detected a
strong correspondence bias, indicating that participants ascribed
behavior more strongly to internal factors (M = 5.80; SD = 0.90)
than to external factors (M = 4.56; SD = 1.24) (t = 11.92, P <
0.001, dz = 0.82).
Relation between correspondence bias, belief in free will, locus of control,
and perceived certainty in the judgments. To test the relation between
the correspondence bias, belief in free will, locus of control, and
perceived certainty in the judgments, we first ran correlational
analyses. Belief in free will correlated with the correspondence
bias (r = 0.35, P < 0.001), with locus of control (r = 0.27, P <
0.001), as well as with perceived certainty in the judgments (r =
0.25, P < 0.001). Moreover, the correspondence bias correlated
with locus of control (r = 0.14, P = 0.038) and perceived certainty
in the judgments (r = 0.18, P = 0.008). Finally, perceived cer-
tainty correlated with locus of control (r = 0.20, P = 0.004).
To test whether locus of control and perceived certainty in the
judgments account for the link between belief in free will and the
correspondence bias, we computed two bias-corrected boot-
strapping mediation analyses (49). Bootstrapping involves the
repeated extraction of samples from the dataset (in this case,
5,000 samples were taken) and the estimation of the indirect
effect in each resampled dataset. The totality of all estimated
indirect effects permits the construction of a 95% confidence
interval for the effect size of the indirect effect. A confidence
interval that includes zero indicates a nonsignificant effect. In all
analyses, we entered the correspondence bias as dependent
variable and belief in free will as the independent variable.
In a first analysis, we entered locus of control as the mediator.
The analysis indicates a significant relation between belief in free
will and locus of control (b = 1.70, SE = 0.42, t = 4.04, P <
0.001). However, the path between locus of control and the
correspondence bias did not reach significance (b = 0.02, SE =
0.02, t = 0.79, P = 0.43). The effect of free-will beliefs on the
correspondence bias remained significant when controlling for
locus of control (b = 0.62, SE = 0.13, t = 4.96, P < 0.001). The
confidence interval (bias corrected) for the indirect path from
belief in free will on the correspondence bias through locus of
control was −0.04 to 0.12 and thus included zero, indicating that
locus of control is not a significant mediator.
In a second analysis, we entered perceived certainty in the
judgments as mediator into the equation. The analysis yielded a
significant relation between belief in free will and perceived
certainty (b = 0.28, SE = 0.07, t = 3.80, P < 0.001). The path
between perceived certainty and the correspondence bias did not
reach significance (b = 0.17, SE = 0.11, t = 1.48, P = 0.14).
However, the effect of belief in free will on the correspondence
bias remained significant when controlling for perceived cer-
tainty (b = 0.60, SE = 0.12, t = 4.84, P < 0.001). The bias-
corrected confidence interval for the indirect path from belief
in free will on the correspondence bias through perceived cer-
tainty was −0.003 to 0.128 and thus included zero, indicating that
perceived certainty is not a significant mediator.
Relation between belief in free will, correspondence bias, and prescribed
behavior. In a final series of analyses, we tested the relation be-
tween belief in free will, the correspondence bias, and prescribed
behavior. Correlational analyses indicate that belief in free will
correlates with overall prescribed behavior (r = 0.33, P < 0.001),
but also with prescribed reward toward positive behavior (r =
0.32, P < 0.001) and prescribed punishment toward negative
behavior (r = 0.27, P < 0.001).
To test the indirect effect of the belief in free will on overall
prescribed behavior via the correspondence bias, we ran an ad-
ditional bias-corrected bootstrapping mediation analysis. The
analysis yielded a significant relation between belief in free will
and overall prescribed behavior (b = 0.37, SE = 0.07, t = 5.12,
P < 0.001). Also, the path between belief in free will and cor-
respondence bias (b = 0.65, SE = 0.12, t = 5.38, P < 0.001) as well
as the path between the correspondence bias and overall pre-
scribed behavior was significant (b = 0.22, SE = 0.04, t = 5.66,
P < 0.001). Moreover, the bias-corrected confidence interval for
the indirect path from belief in free will on prescribed behavior
via the correspondence bias was 0.084–0.218 and thus did not
include zero, indicating that the correspondence bias is a sig-
nificant mediator of the relation between belief in free will and
prescribed behavior (Fig. 2).
Relationship Between Free-Will Beliefs and Internal Versus
External Attribution
All our studies demonstrate that believing in free will is positively
related to the correspondence bias. An interesting question is
whether this relation is due to an increase in internal attribution,
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a decrease in external attribution, or both. To shed light on this
question, we ran a mini metaanalysis (50) across all of our studies
that assessed participants’ attribution to external as well as to
internal factors (i.e., studies 2–4). We first transformed each
correlation into Fisher’s z and then ran the metaanalysis. The
analysis yielded a significant positive correlation between belief
in free will and person attribution (Mr = 0.29, Z = 10.75, P <
0.001) and a significant negative correlation between belief in
free will and situation attribution (Mr = −0.14, Z = −5.63, P <
0.001). Fully random effects tests of the same correlations were
also significant, as indicated by one-sample t tests of the mean
effect size against zero (Mrperson attribution = 0.29, t = 5.10, P =
0.007; Mrsituation attribution = −0.14, t = −6.03, P = 0.004).
General Discussion
Prominent scientists have questioned the existence of free will
both in publications addressed to other scholars (e.g., refs. 5–7)
and in the mass media (9–11). Independent of the validity of this
claim, the question arises whether it matters if people believe in
free will or not. In the studies reported in this paper, we tested
the impact of the belief in free will on social perception. To this
end, we investigated the relationship between the belief in free
will and the correspondence bias in six studies (29, 31, 32). Our
findings demonstrate that the belief in free will is positively as-
sociated with the correspondence bias, and that it is attenuated
when people’s belief in free will is weakened. Moreover, study
4 shows that the link between belief in free will and the corre-
spondence bias can neither be explained by participants’ locus of
control nor by participants’ certainty in their judgments. More-
over, study 4 demonstrates that the correspondence bias mediates
the relationship between the belief in free will and prescribed
punishment and rewarding behavior toward others.
These results have important theoretical implications. First,
our findings allow for disentangling two contrasting hypotheses
regarding the influence of free-will beliefs on the correspon-
dence bias. On the one hand, the literature indicates that the
correspondence bias is less pronounced when people are highly
motivated or when they can exploit their cognitive resources
(e.g., ref. 31). Given that it has been argued that believing in free
will positively affects self-regulation (22–25, 34), the resource
hypothesis predicts that believing in free will should reduce the
correspondence bias. On the other hand, it has been demon-
strated that believing in free will increases perceived intentional
control (23, 35). As people use their own representations to
understand and predict other people’s behavior (for an overview,
see refs. 36 and 37), the intention attribution hypothesis predicts
that individuals also perceive others’ behavior as internally
driven and, thus, less strongly influenced by the environment,
resulting in an increased correspondence bias. Our data clearly
support the intention attribution hypothesis and thus suggest that
it is not increased self-control, but perceived intentional control
in others that fosters the correspondence bias.
Second, the basic observation that the belief in free will affects
the correspondence bias indicates that such belief changes can
eventually influence our social interactions. Shariff et al. (27)
already reported that believing in free will increases prescribed
punishment of negative behavior. Our research expands this
finding by demonstrating that free-will beliefs increase not only
prescribed punishment of negative behavior but also prescribed
reward of positive behavior. In other words, not only do free-will
beliefs affect prescribed actions toward negative and immoral
behavior, but they also have a broader influence on how people
react to others’ behavior. Moreover, the results of study 4 dem-
onstrate that the relationship between free-will beliefs and pre-
scribed behavior is due to stronger attribution to internal as
compared to external causes. This result may be particularly
relevant to court cases. For instance, recent research showed that
judges afforded shorter sentences to hypothetical psychopathic
criminals when the description of the criminals’ psychopathy in-
cluded internal causes, such as biomechanical components (51).
Our results therefore raise the question whether shifting public
perception toward a scientific “anti–free-will” perspective may
encourage judges and jurors to emphasize external, as compared
to internal, factors when taking a decision. As in the legal system
the punishment strongly depends on the degree to which a person
acted intentionally, a stronger focus on external, as compared to
internal, forces would lead to lower retributive punishments.
Third, our research also has important implications for research
on the correspondence bias itself. Previous research found that the
correspondence bias is influenced by different moderators, such as
mood (52) or cultural background (42)—to name just a few ex-
amples. The current research is in line with these findings, sug-
gesting that the strength of the correspondence bias is based on
top-down modulations. Moreover, our findings expand these re-
sults by demonstrating that the correspondence bias is influenced
by abstract beliefs, such as the belief in free will.
Despite these implications, there are a few issues that need
further discussion. First, some researchers recently documented
difficulties in replicating the effect of reduced free-will beliefs on
moral behavior (53–55) and other behavioral variables (15, 56). It
is important to note, however, that in most of these cases the
failed replications were not due to failed manipulation checks, but
rather due to failures in replicating the relationship between the
manipulation and the dependent variable. Moreover, previous
research that could not significantly reduce individuals’ belief in
free will with the Crick text (e.g., ref. 53) used the Free Will and
Determinism scale (FWD) (cf. 53) as manipulation check, which
had a relatively low reliability (i.e., Cronbach’s α = 0.43), and
tested rather few participants (i.e., ref. 57) rendering the inter-
pretations difficult. In contrast, in our experimental studies, we
assessed much larger samples and achieved good reliability of the
FWI scale (i.e., MCronbach’s α = 0.80). Moreover, we replicated our
findings within preregistered studies. Nevertheless, we have to
acknowledge that, despite consistent results, the employed belief
manipulation produced rather weak effects. A reason might be
that all our studies were conducted in online settings in which
participants’ motivation may be limited. For future research, we
therefore recommend using the belief manipulation in laboratory
settings. On the basis of the preregistered study, we also recom-
mend including selection criteria based on reading checks and the
time participants spend on the crucial text passage.
Second, in all our studies, we assessed participants’ belief
in free will by computing a compound score of the FWI (40)
that included the dualism/nonreductionism and the reversed
determinism subscales. The reason for using such a compound
score was that we wanted to measure to which degree partici-
pants believe that humans have free will in the sense that they
can generate behavior that is not fully determined by prior events
together with the laws of nature (4). The use of the compound
score was further justified by an acceptable to good (58) internal
consistency (MCronbach’s α = 0.77). Nevertheless, one may argue
that the compound score does not capture specifically the folk
intuition about free will (40, 57). It is important to note,
Belief in free will Prescribed behavior
Correspondence bias
.65*** .22***
.37*** (.23**)
Fig. 2. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the relation between
belief in free will and prescribed behavior as mediated by the correspon-
dence bias. The coefficient between belief in free will and prescribed be-
havior, controlling for the correspondence bias, is in parentheses. ***P <
0.001, **P < 0.01.
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however, that a metaanalysis (for details, see Supporting In-
formation) across all of our six studies indicates that also the
FWI’s free-will subscale significantly correlates with the corre-
spondence bias suggesting that our results hold even when
measuring more specific beliefs about free will.
Third, the scope of the present research was to examine the role
of belief in free will on the attribution of other person’s behavior.
However, an open question is whether similar tendencies can be
observed when individuals judge their own behavior. In this
sense, a phenomenon related to the correspondence bias is the
self-serving bias (for a review, see ref. 59)—people’s tendency to
attribute positive events to internal factors (e.g., own character)
and negative events to external factors (e.g., situation). At this
point, we can only speculate to which degree belief in free will
affects the self-serving bias. However, given that free-will beliefs
increase internal attributions and decrease external attributions
in the correspondence bias, one could assume that belief in free
will increases internal attribution to positive events and de-
creases external attribution to negative events in the self-
serving bias. Future research may aim at testing this assumption
more directly.
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